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MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
"ARISING OUT OF BUSINESS DONE IN THE STATE"
By GEORGE E. OSBORNE*
F a foreign corporation doing business in a state authorizes some
person in the state to receive service of a process, jurisdiction
over it is not confined to obligations arising out of the business
there done.' If such a corporation gives no actual authorization to
anyone to receive service, but a responsible agent 2 of the corpora-
tion is served in the state, it is an unsettled question whether it can
be held subject to the state's jurisdiction on obligations which did
not arise out of business done in the state.3 If there is no consent to
anyone receiving service and service is made on a state official
designated by statute but having no connection with the corpora-
tion it is clear that jurisdiction is restricted to cases in which the
obligation arose out of the business 4 done in the state.5 The scope
*Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
'Bagdon v. Philadelphia and Reading Coal Co., (1916) 217 N. Y. 432,
111 N. E. 1075, L.R.A. 1916F 407, Ann. Cas. 1918A 389; Smolik v. Phila-
delphia and Reading Coal Co., (1915) 222 Fed. 148; Gold Issue Mining Co.
v. Penn. Fire Ins. Co., (1917) 243 U. S. 93, 61 L. Ed. 610, 37 S.C.R. 344.
In this last case the defendant had filed consent to service upon a public
official; contra, Sawyer v. No. Am. Life Ins. Co., (1874) 46 Vt. 697. For
a collection of cases see L.R.A. 1916F 410 note.2
"Whether process served on a member of the corporate group can be
the foundation of a judgment.. .turns on... whether the particular person
on whom the writ was served was a sufficiently responsible member of the
intelligent portion of the group to make it moderately certain that guiding
officers will be apprised of the suit." Henderson, The Position of Foreign
Corporations in American Constitutional Law 171. See also Henderson
op. cit. pp. 91-92 and cases cited, particularly Connecticut Life Ins. Co. v.
Spratley, (1898) 172 U.S. 602, 610, 43 L. Ed. 569, 19 S.C.R. 308.3Fry v. Denver, etc., R. Co., (1915) 226 Fed. 893 and Takacs v. Phila-
delphia and Reading Ry. Co., (1915) 228 Fed. 728 hold there can be no
jurisdiction. There are contrary decisions: Atchison, etc., Ry. Co. v.
Weeks, (1918) 248 Fed. 970; Reynolds v. Missouri, etc., Ry., (1917) 228
Mass. 584, 117 N.E. 913; Lagergren v. Penn. R. Co., (1915) 130 Minn. 35,
152 N.W. 1102; Rishmiller v. Denver, etc., R. Co., (1916) 134 Minn. 261,
159 N.W. 272; Merchants Elevator Co. v. Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co.,
(1920) 147 Minn. 188, 179 N.W. 734; Callaghan v. Union Pacific R. Co.,
(1921) 148 Minn. 482, 182 N.W. 1004; Farmers' Co-operative Equity Co.
v. Payne, (1921) 150 Minn. 534, 186 N.W. 130; Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal
Co., (1917) 220 N.Y. 259, 115 N.E. 915; El Paso and Southwestern Co., v.
Chisholm, (Tex. Civ. App. 1915) 180 S.W. 156. No case has yet been
carried to the United States Supreme Court, the ultimate arbiter of the
question.4 The term "business" may be used in two senses. It may mean a busi-
ness transaction or agreement. It may also mean an establishment with a
fixed location, stock in trade, staff of workers and managers, etc. It is not
clear which meaning the courts give it. See quotations in note 5, post.
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of the limitation in this last case has never been thoroughly ana-
lysed.
Starting with the assumption that the foreign corporation is
doing business in the state within the meaning of these service
statutes,6 that business may be conducted in at least two different
sOld Wayne Mut. Life Assn. v. McDonough, (1907) 204 U.S. 8, 51 L.
Ed. 345, 27 S.C.R. 236; Simon v. Southern R. Co., (1914) 236 U.S. 115, 59
L. Ed. 492, 35 S.C.R. 255.
The courts have stated this restriction in varying language. Pertinent
extracts from the decisions on this point follow:
"Conceding.. .the defendant association may be held to have assented
to the service upon the insurance commissioner of process in a suit brought
against it there in respect of business transacted by it in that common-
wealth, such assent cannot properly be implied where it affirmatively
appears, as it does here, that the business was not transacted in Pennsyl-
vania... While the highest considerations of public policy demand that an
insurance corporation, entering a state in defiance of a statute which law-
fully prescribes the terms upon which it may exert its powers there, should
be held to have assented to such terms as to business there transacted by
it, ... we do not imply such assent as to business transacted in another state,
although citizens of the former state may be interested in such business.
As the suit in the Pennsylvania court was upon a contract executed in
Indiana,...we hold that the judgment in Pennsylvania was not entitled 'to
full faith and credit in another state.'" Old Wayne Mut. Life Ass'n
v. McDonough, (1907) 204 U.S. 8, 51 L. Ed. 345, 27 S.C.R. 236.
"But this power to designate by statute the officer upon whom service
in suits against foreign corporations may be made relates to business and
transactions within the jurisdiction of the state enacting the law. Other-
wise, claims on contracts wherever made, and suits for torts wherever com-
mitted might be drawn to the jurisdiction of any state in which the for-
eign corporation might at any time be doing business,...the statutory con-
sent of a foreign corporation to be sued does not extend to causes of action
arising in other states." Simon v. Southern R. Co., (1914) 236 U.S. 115,
59 L. Ed. 492, 35 S.C.R. 255.
"This power is limited to instances where the action is based upon
transactions had or business done within the jurisdiction of the state
wherein the service is had... such assent [to service] may be only implied
... in actions founded on contracts originating within the state of serv-
ice... it must appear that the cause arose from the business there
done." Fry v. Denver, etc., R. Co., (1915) 226 Fed. 893.
"...it [i. e., service on the designated state official] could be good only
in causes of action arising out of the business of the corporation in the
state..." Atchison, etc., Ry. Co. v. Weeks, (1918) 248 Fed. 970. Almost
identical language is used in Smolik v. Philadelphia and Reading Coal &
Iron Co., (1915) 222 Fed. 148.
"Causes of action arising out of business and transactions transpiring
within the state." El Paso and Southwestern Co. v. Chisholm, (Tex. Civ.
App. 1915) 180 S.W. 156. In Reynolds v. Missouri, etc., Ry. Co., (1917)
228 Mass. 584, 117 N.E. 913, practically the same phraseology was employed.
"Causes of action arising in the state where the action is brought."
Rishmiller v. Denver, etc., R. Co., (1916) 134 Minn. 261, 159 N.W. 272.
"The cause of action sued upon has no relation in its origin to the
business here transacted." Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., (1917) 220
N.Y. 259, 115 N.E. 915.6
"Business may be sufficient to subject the foreign corporation that does
it to the service of process, and yet insufficient to require it to take out a
license." International Text Book Co. v. Tone, (1917) 220 N.Y. 313, 318,
115 N.E. 914. See Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., (1917) 220 N.Y. 259,
268, 115 N.E. 915.
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ways. A local business plant or organization, having a fixed habit-
ation with activities radiating out from it as a center, may have
been established. A branch store of any kind would be an
example. On the other hand, the headquarters of all the business
done by the corporation and the corporation itself may be located
in the foreign state, but it is possible that, by regularly entering
into a great many separate business transactions within the state
it would be held to be doing business there.7 A foreign manufac-
turing corporation making sales and deliveries within the state
through travelling agents will serve as an illustration.8
Where the business is conducted in the first described manner
several cases may be imagined. First, the contract may be
entered into and the breach of it occur in state A where the busi-
ness is carried on.10 In such a case both the primary and second-
""Here was a continuous course of business in the solicitation of orders
which were sent to another state and in response to which the machines of
the Harvester Company were delivered within the state of Kentucky. This
was a course of business, not a single transaction.. .This... constituted a
doing of business there." International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, (1913)
234 U.S. 579, 584, 58 L. Ed. 1479, 34 S.C.R. 944. Duluth Log Co. v. Pulp-
wood Co., (1917) 137 Minn. 312, 163 N.W. 520; Fleischman Const. Co. v.
Blauners, (1919) 190 App. Div. 95, 179 N.Y.S. 193, accord. The recent
case of Massey v. Norske Lloyd Ins. Co., (Minn. 1922) 189 N.W. 714,
apparently falls within this class.
slnternational Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, (1913) 234 U.S. 579, 58
L. Ed. 1479, 34 S.C.R. 944.
u"A method of service is insufficient when, although it may have a
tendency to give notice to the defendant, yet there is another way obviously
better calculated to give notice. [Thus] service by publication is insuffi-
cient when personal service is possible (Bardwell v. Collins, (1890) 44
Minn. 97, 46 N.W. 315) or where the defendant had left the state but his
family remained at his last place of abode. McDonald v. Mabee, (1917) 243
U.S. 90, 61 L. Ed. 608, 37 S.C.R." Scott, Business Jurisdiction over Non-
residents, 32 Harv. L. Rev. 871, 875 note 25. Under this principle it would
seem that service on a state official designated by statute would not be good
if there could be service upon a real agent of the corporation in the state.
This would always be possible so long as it continued to do business in the
state in this way. The problem under discussion could arise, therefore,
only when, after the corporation has ceased to do business in the state,
suit is brought on a cause of action arising prior to the withdrawal. Where
a foreign corporation doing business in the state had consented to service
on a state official it was held that the state might validly provide for such
service after the corporation had ceased to do business, at least as to "con-
troversies growing out of that business." Mutual Reserve Life, etc., Ass'n
v. Phelps, (1903) 190 U.S. 147, 47 L. Ed. 987, 23 S.C.R. 707. Tucker v.
Ins. Co., (1919) 232 Mass. 224, 122 N.E. 285, accord. Semble, McCord
Lumber Co. v. Doyle, (1899) 97 Fed. 22. Cf. Hunter v. Mutual Reserve
Life Ins. Co., (1910) 218 U.S. 573, 54 L. Ed. 1155, 31 S.C.R. 127.
'E.g., a contract made in the state to deliver goods in the state and a
failure to deliver the goods.
For the sake of simplicity it will be assumed throughout this paper
that the law of the state where the contractual agreement is consummated
governs the creation of the contractual obligations; and that the law where
the contract is to be performed governs the creation of the obligations
growing out of the breach. On the general question of what law governs
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ary"' obligations arise in that state. Second, the contract may be
made in state B where the corporation is not doing business and
is not incorporated but the breach may occur in state A.12 Third,
the contract may be made in state A but the breach occur in state
B.' 3  Fourth, both the primary contractual obligation may be
created and the remedial obligation arise in state B.' 4 A fifth
problem can be raised by supposing in situations two to four that
the foreign corporation also does business in state B through
another branch plant. The question then would be whether, by
serving the state official named by statute, the corporation can be
sued in state B on an obligation incurred through dealings with the
branch business organization in state A though the legal obligation,
either primary or secondary, or both, was created by the law of
state B. In all of these situations the obligations arose out of
activities emanating from the business located in state A.
the creation and performance of contracts see Beale, What Law Governs
the Validity of a Contract, 23 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 79, 194, 260; Lorenzen,
Validity and Effects of Contracts in the Conflict of Laws, 30 Yale L. Jour.
565, 655, 31 Yale L. Jour. 53; 3 Beale, Cases on Conflict of Laws 540-544.
Most of the same problems could be raised under other theories as to what
law controlled by varying the facts of the hypothetical cases.
"1"The first division, primary rights, includes all the rights created by
law and existent in the ordinary proper course of events, unaffected by
illegal interference. The second division, secondary rights, includes rights
which arise upon the violation of primary rights by the wrong of some
responsible human actor; they are created by law in order that reparation
may be made for the wrongful destruction of each primary right." Beale,
A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws, Vol. I, Part I, p. 165.
"The entire legal relation-the vinculum juris-resulting from that
[contractual] agreement may be called a primary, contractual obligation."
"Let it be assumed, however, that X, without excuse fails to per-
form... In such a case a new legal relation-a secondary, or remedial,
obligation arises between A and X. The latter, as a consequence of the
breach of his primary duty, is now under a remedial duty to make... repa-
ration..., " Hohfeld, Nature of Stockholder's Individual Liability for Cor-
poration Debts, 9 Col. L. Rev. 285, 293.
'
2E.g., the "business" in A sends an agent with full power to contract
into B where an agreement is made to ship goods in A. There is a failure
to ship.
Some of the language in the quotations in note 5, supra, from Old
Wayne Ins. Co. v. McDonough, Simon v. Southern R. Co., and Fry v. D.
& R. G. R. Co. would exclude this case. None of the actual decisions are
on the point, however, and other language in the same cases and in other
decisions would indicate that the only obligation which need arise in the
state is the secondary obligation, e.g., see the quotation from Rishmiller v.
Denver, etc., R. Co., supra, note 5. "Cause of action" as there used
apparently means the obligation arising from the breach of the primary
obligation. Look also at last sentence in the quotation from Simon v.
Southern R. Co.
'
3E.g. the agreement is entered into in A to deliver goods in B and
there is a failure to deliver: See the quotation from Fry v. Denver, etc.,
R. Co., supra, note 5. See also. Fletcher v. Southern Colonization Co.,(1921) 148 Minn..143, 146, 181 N.W. 205.
14E.g. the same facts as in note 12, supra, except the agreement is to
deliver goods in state B.
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In the case of torts the secondary obligation always must be
created by the same law which fixes the primary in rem right
which is violated. 15 Consequently only the secondary obligation
need be taken into account and the second and third problems
above could not arise. 18 However, a tort occurring in state B as
the result of activities having their directing source in a business in
state A could be regarded, in a natural sense, at least, as arising
out of that business.1
7
If the "doing business" in the state were of the second kind
described, the fourth problem need not be considered. If the
agreement were both made and fulfilled outside of state A, even
though the corporation be considered to be "doing business" in
that state, there is nothing in either the ordinary business sense or
in legal contemplation which could be regarded as connected with
any business organization of any business transaction there."8
The same is true in the case of torts. Further, assuming that
the business transaction took place partly in state A where the
corporation was "doing business" and partly in state B, and that,
in the course of carrying out that part of the transaction which
occurred in state B, the corporation committed a tort, it is difficult
to conceive of a situation in which the tort could have had any
connection with that part of the transaction occurring in state
A.' 9 Hence it would seem that the tort always must be com-
mitted in the state where the corporation is "doing business" in
this manner in order to say it arose out of the business done
there.
Having narrowed the field of inquiry to enumerated situations
in which, in one sense or another, the obligation can be said to be
connected with the business carried on in the state, the further
15LeForest v. Tolman, (1875) 117 Mass. 109, 19 Am. Rep. 400. See
Fry v. Denver, etc., R. Co., (1915) 226 Fed. 893, 894.
16Probably the same is true of quasi-contractual obligations. As to
the nature of quasi-contractual obligations see Woodward, Quasi-Contracts,
sec. 3, 1. See also, Corbiu, Quasi Contractual Obligations, 21 Yale L. 3.
533.
17E.g. the business in state A agrees to deliver a truck in state B.
While the truck is being driven from state A to its destination in state B,
it injures a person in state B as a result of the driver's negligence.
A quasi-contractual obligation arising in some similar manner could
be regarded as connected up with the business in state A, e.g., overpayment
by mutual mistake in state B.
ISApparently this was the situation in Old Wayne Ins. Co. v. Mc-
Donough, (1907) 204 U.S. 8, 51 L. Ed. 345, 27 S.C.R. 236.
191t is arguable that an exception exists in the case of deceit. It may
be possible to say that an act which results in injury, induced in state B by
reason of an agreement fraudulently obtained in state A, is linked up with
the part of the whole transaction which took place in state A.
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question remains whether all of them fall within the terms of the
legal limitation on jurisdiction. Clearly the first case put does so
under any interpretation of its purpose. Whether the others do so
depends upon the rationale of the restriction. The fundamental
reason for some kind of limitation is the obvious fact that this
kind of process is necessarily unsatisfactory and ordinarily insuf-
ficient.20  It ought to be restricted in its operation so far as possi-
ble and yet not allow the corporation to elude those who should
be able to hold it accountable within the state. The test of juris-
diction, that the obligation must arise out of some business done
in the state, would appear to be a groping for some rule to desig-
nate who these persons should be.2 1 It is submitted, a reasonable
2 0
"The method of service on a statutory officer is open to serious
abuse, and it may be justified only as a necessary protection to residents of
the state." Henderson, Position of Foreign Corporations in American
Constitutional Law 99. Should the United States Supreme Court hold that
service in the state upon an agent of the corporation is valid only as to obli-
gations arising out of business done in the state (see note 3, supra) it would
be difficult to sustain this reasoning.
Another reason suggested is the hardship upon the corporation in being
compelled to defend a suit in a state far from the place where the trans-
action out of which it grew took place. See Rishmiller v. Denver, etc.,
R. Co., (1916) 134 Minn. 261, 265, 159 N.W. 272; Simon v. Southern Ry.
Co., (1914) 236 U.S. 115, 130, 59 L. Ed. 492, 35 S.C.R. 255. This is a factor
which has some weight; but if it were the basic reason for the limitation
it would apply equally where service was on an actual agent of the corpora-
tion. That it would apply in such a case however, seems improbable. See
note 3, supra. Further, as the Massachusetts court has expressed it, "the
argument ab inconvenienti urged on behalf of the defendant is met by one
of equal force on the side of the plaintiff" if he has to go to the home of
the foreign corporation to sue. Reynolds v. Missouri, etc., Ry. Co., (1917)
228 Mass. 584, 588, 117 N. E. 913.2 1See Hunter v. Mutual Reserve Life Ins. Co., (1906) 184 N.Y. 136,
144, 76 N.E. 1072, 30 L.R.A. (N.S.) 677, 6 Ann. Cas. 291, affd. 218 U. S.
573, 54 L. Ed. 1155, 31 S.C.R. 127, 30 L.R.A. (N.S.) 686, where the court
says statutes like these were "primarily designed for the protection of the
citizens of the state." For similar statements see Mutual Reserve, etc.,
Ass'n v. Phelps, (1902) 190 U.S. 147, 158, 47 L. Ed. 987, 23 S.C.R. 797;
Sawyer v. North American Life Ins. Co., (1874) 46 Vt. 695, 706. Cf. last
line of the first paragraph quoted from the Old Wayne Case, supra note 5.
A possible explanation of the reason for the usual terms of the restric-
tion is the doubtful constitutionality of a state statute saying that
only citizens of that state might sue the foreign corporation there. Barrell
v. Benjamin, (1819) 15 Mass. 354; State v. North American Land & Tim-
ber Co., (1902) 106 La. 621, 31 So. 172; Reeves v. Southern Ry. Co., (1905)
121 Ga. 513, 49 S.E. 594, Cf. So. Carl & Ga. R. Co. v. Eietzen, (1897) 101
Ga. 730, 732, 29 S.E. 292. Of course, no doubt would exist if the plaintiff
were a foreign corporation. See 70 L.R.A. 514 for a collection of cases.
But even if such a rule were constitutional, the general policy, certainly,
is to allow citizens of another state to sue on the same terms as citizens of
the state where the action is brought. That is true, even though the statute
allowing the action was primarily for the benefit of citizens of the state.
Johnston v. Trade Ins. Co., (1882) 132 Mass. 432. It would violate no
constitutional provision, however, to say that only obligations arising out
of business done in the state could be sued upon. In most cases such obli-
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interpretation of the test is that anyone who has dealings within
the state22 with the corporation should be able to hold the corpora-
tion there. The word "dealing" is meant to include, not merely
the entering into a transaction but also its performance and the
consequences thereof. Hence, if either the primary or secondary
obligation arose within the state where the corporation was doing
business, the corporation should be held accountable there.
Further, if the business dealing out of which a contractual obliga-
tion grew was with a business organization, then, even though both
the primary and secondary rights arose in another state, the
corporation should be liable to suit where its business
branch, the actual entity dealt with, was located. In such
a case reasonable expectations 23  were raised that the cor-
poration could be reached and held accountable where the "busi-
ness" with which the transactions were entered into was located.
Those expectations ought to be realized in spite of the unsatisfac-
tory character of the service. There seems to be, however, no
such reason in the case of torts.2 4 The business carried on in one
state can scarcely be said to have created reasonable expectation in
a tortfeasee in another state, that, if he were injured he could sue
the corporation in the first state.
In a recent Minnesota case 25 this whole problem was ignored.
In that case a foreign insurance corporation was carrying on busi-
gations would run to residents of the state and thus the desired result
would be achieved without violating either the constitution or good policy.2 2See Hunter v. Mutual Reserve Life Ins. Co., (1910) 218 U.S. 573,
590, 54 L. Ed. 1155, 31 S.C.R. 127, 30 L.R.A. (N.S.) 686. This rule would
operate to protect residents of the state, the ones for whom the state has
primary concern, since they will be the ones in all ordinary cases who will
have dealings within the state with the foreign corporation. Further, it
does not impose on the corporation the duty of defending at a place away
from where the transaction occurred.
23"Jural Postulate III. In civilized society men must be able to
assume that those with whom they deal in the general intercourse of society
will act in good faith, and hence (a) will make good reasonable expectations
which their promises or other conduct reasonably create." Pound, Outline
of a Course on the History and System of the Common Law 44. Dean
Pound framed this postulate with reference to the enforceability of obliga-
tions. It seems, however, equally applicable to a situation like this.2 4Again. an exception may exist in the case of deceit. If the "business"
in state A fraudulently induces a person in B to enter into a transaction
whereby he is damaged it is arguable that, on entering into the agree-
ment he may have anticipated, not merely a breach of contract, but that the
whole transaction was a fraud upon him. In such a case he may be said
to have relied upon being able to reach the corporation in state A if the
deal did turn out to be a deceit upon him. See Pound, op. cit., note 23.
The same reasoning would apply to most quasi-contractual obligations.
e.g.. by mutual mistake in settling acounts there is an overpayment in
state B to the "business" operating in state A.
25.Nassey S. S Co. v. Norske Lloyd Ins. Co., (Minn. 1922) 189 N.W.
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ness in the second described manner. A Minnesota corporation
took out an insurance policy on a ship having its situs in Minne-
sota .2  The insurance contract was entered into in Wisconsin, or,
at any rate, not in Minnesota.2 7  The loss occurred in Michigan
territorial waters. 2s It did not appear where the policy was pay-
able. The court held that the insurance corporation was doing
business in the state and therefore was subject to the jurisdiction
of Minnesota courts through service on the state insurance com-
missioner although no consent to his receiving service had been
given. The court did not even consider the question whether the
obligation sought to be enforced arose out of the business done in
Minnesota. If the contract were to be performed in Minnesota
the result on this point seems correct, for the secondary obligation
at least would have arisen in Minnesota..2 9 If the policy was paya-
ble in Wisconsin, the decision is open to doubt.
26The case in this respect appears indistinguishable from Old Wayne
Life Ins. Co. v. McDonough, (1907) 204 U.S. 8, 51 L. Ed. 345, 27 S.C.R.
236. There, an insured person was within the state; here, insured property
was within the state.
The law of the situs of insured property generally is held to have, as
such, no effect upon the insurance contract. See 63 L.R.A. 833, 855 for a
collection of cases.27The insured corporation sent its order for the policies from its office
in Superior, Wisconsin, to a Chicago insurance broker. The broker
obtained the policies from the insurance corporation. The policies were
signed outside the state of Minnesota. On receiving them, the brokers for-
warded them to the insured at Superior.
There are different theories as to when a contract of insurance is com-
pleted, but under any of them it is clear that on these facts it was not
entered into in Minnesota. See Patterson, The Delivery of a Life Insur-
ance Policy, 33 Harv. L. Rev. 198. See also, 63 L.R.A. 833; 23 L.R.A.
(N.S.) 968; 52 L.R.A. (N.S.) 275. Indeed, the Minnesota court went on the
assumption that the contract had not been executed in Minnesota.28The court correctly decided that this did not have any bearing upon
the question at issue. See 63 L.R.A. 833, 855.20This would distinguish the case from Old Wayne Ins. Co. v. Mc-
Donough, (1907) 204 U.S. 8, 51 L. Ed. 345, 27 S.C.R. 236. There the con-
tract of insurance was not only made outside the state but was payable
where made.
On the question whether the law of the place of performance should
govern the secondary obligation arising upon failure to perform see Lor-
enzen. Validity and Effects of Contracts in the Conflict of Laws, 31 Yale L.
Jour. 53, 66-72.
